Skip to content

People-Centred Security ​

Technical controls alone cannot secure an organisation. People — employees, contractors, and leadership — are both a significant vulnerability and, when properly engaged, a powerful security asset. People-centred security focuses on designing security programmes that account for human behaviour rather than treating people as a problem to be overcome.

Why people-centred security matters ​

  • Phishing remains the primary initial access vector in most breaches
  • Security fatigue and alert overload lead to poor decisions
  • Security controls that are too restrictive lead to shadow IT and workarounds
  • A positive security culture generates voluntary reporting of incidents and near-misses

The NCSC explicitly includes people-centred security as a topic because organisations that treat security as purely a technical problem consistently underperform those that engage their workforce.

Security awareness training ​

What works and what doesn't ​

Ineffective approaches:

  • Annual compliance-driven e-learning (ticked as done; forgotten immediately)
  • Generic, non-contextual training
  • Blaming and shaming individuals who click phishing simulations
  • Training that focuses on rules without explaining the "why"

Effective approaches:

  • Short, frequent, relevant training (5–10 minute modules monthly rather than 1 hour annually)
  • Role-based training — finance team receives BEC-focused training; developers receive secure coding training
  • Simulated phishing — as a learning tool, not a gotcha; debrief and educate, do not punish
  • Storytelling — real-world breach examples relevant to the organisation's sector
  • Just-in-time training — present a learning moment immediately after a user clicks a simulated phish

NCSC's "Forget compliance, focus on behaviour" approach ​

The NCSC advocates shifting from compliance mindset ("did everyone complete the training?") to behaviour change ("are people actually making better security decisions?").

Measure outcomes, not inputs:

  • Phishing simulation click rate trend (down over time)
  • Reported phishing/suspicious emails (up over time — more reporting is good)
  • Password reset requests (down as passwordless/SSO is adopted)
  • Shadow IT incidents (down as approved tools meet user needs)

Reducing friction ​

Security controls that create excessive friction are bypassed:

  • If MFA is too cumbersome, users will share credentials
  • If VPN is too slow, users will access resources directly
  • If the approved tool doesn't work, users will use an unapproved one

Design security to minimise friction for legitimate use cases while maximising friction for attackers:

  • SSO reduces login friction while centralising authentication
  • Password managers make strong unique passwords practical
  • ZTNA provides better user experience than VPN for many use cases

Insider threat ​

Types of insider threat ​

TypeDescription
MaliciousIntentional harm — data theft, sabotage
NegligentAccidental harm — misconfiguration, data loss
CompromisedLegitimate user whose credentials or account has been taken over

Detecting insider threats ​

  • UEBA — baseline normal behaviour; alert on deviations (see AI, Analytics & SIEM)
  • Data loss prevention — detect bulk data access or exfiltration
  • Privileged access monitoring — PAM session recording for admin accounts
  • Joiners/movers/leavers process — promptly revoke access on departure; review access on role change

Responding proportionately ​

Insider threat programmes must balance security with employee privacy and legal obligations. In the UK:

  • Data monitoring must be proportionate and disclosed in employment policies
  • GDPR applies to employee monitoring
  • Engage HR and legal before implementing monitoring programmes

Security culture ​

A positive security culture has these characteristics:

  • Leadership models secure behaviour (they use MFA; they don't share passwords)
  • Reporting is encouraged and rewarded — no blame culture for honest mistakes
  • Security is seen as a business enabler, not a blocker
  • Security team is approachable — employees ask before doing something risky

Measuring security culture ​

  • Regular staff surveys on security attitudes
  • Near-miss / good-catch reporting rates
  • Security team NPS (Net Promoter Score from internal customers)

Further reading ​

  • NCSC People-centred security — ncsc.gov.uk/people-centred-security
  • NCSC "A board-level responsibility" guidance
  • SANS Security Awareness programme maturity model
  • ENISA "Cybersecurity Culture Guidelines"